Admin Note:  I found a list of Casuality notes from sinkings.  I thought I would share these with you because MY view on sinkings is IF you play in the pond long enough and often enough....IT IS GOING TO HAPPEN!  It is just a matter of when.  IMHO you better to be prepared, You better understand the danger, You better stand ready!

Casualty Data

(1) F/V Predator. Sinking, 28 December 1998, one dead, one survivor.

F/V Predator was returning to Ocean City, MD with 113 loaded conch pots stowed aft, each weighing 40 pounds. The Captain noticed water on the deck and slowed the vessel's speed to find the source. Water came over the stern, swamping the well deck within 45 seconds. The vessel remained afloat with 4-5 feet of the bow above the water. The Captain managed to issue a distress call but his radio was not set on a distress frequency. The life raft deployed hours later and both men swam to it. The Captain died of hypothermia overnight. The vessel was not reported overdue until 0830 the next day.

Preliminary Findings:

(READ MORE---->Below)

• The operator had his radio set to Channel 10, a working frequency, vice Channel 16 the distress radio frequency, and in his haste to scramble to safety on the bow had only enough time to say "Mayday" once.
• The immersion suits were inaccessible. Two persons were able to break the boat's plexiglas windows and retrieve lifejackets, but not the immersion suits that, if donned, would have prolonged the onset of hypothermia.
• The life raft and emergency radio beacon (EPIRB) were atop the pilothouse. Because the boat assumed a stern down attitude with 4-5 feet of the bow above water, the hydrostatic pressure was insufficient to release either device.
• The EPIRB was registered under the vessel's former name. The operator never re-registered the EPIRB when he bought the boat. Therefore, potentially vital information would not have been available to rescuers even if the signal was transmitted. Tests of the EPIRB showed it worked properly, but the canister and hydrostatic release were not recovered for testing.
• A crewmember attempted to free the life raft in the first few seconds by pulling on the straps. He was able to get only one strap off. He did not know he could release the raft by pulling the sea painter (a rope attached to the raft). The raft later deployed, most likely after the other strap gave way.

The preliminary findings point to an overriding problem - training. All the equipment in the world will not save fishermen's lives if they do not take the time to learn how to respond to emergencies. These two people had less than a minute to scramble to the vessel's bow. A common thread in many fishing vessel losses is the suddenness with which they sink. Either there is a significant situational awareness problem or the problems develop so fast there is little time to respond.